Under limited asset market participation …scal consolidations have a deep and prolonged de ‡ationary e¤ect, causing substantial short term welfare losses to households whose access to …nancial markets is limited. We show that it is possible to both reduce public debt and boost consumption of constrained households. This is obtained by allowing taxes to immediately undershoot their post-consolidation steady-state values. A similar result is achieved if temporary public transfers to constrained households are exploited to stimulate demand. We also …nd that an interest rate rule which reacts not only to in ‡ation but also to the output gap is an e¤ective complement to …scal policy as a stabilization tool. In fact, the output gap target induces the Central Bank to implement a stronger interest rate cut which triggers a surge in the consumption of Ricardian households. This, in turn, has bene…cial e¤ects on labor incomes and on RT households' consumption. We obtain the apparently paradoxical result that such a policy allows to obtain better control of in ‡ation, limiting de ‡ationary pressures.
Introduction
Following the large increases in public debt-to-GDP ratios observed in the aftermath of the 2007-…nancial crisis, the issue of …scal consolidation, i.e. a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio, has come to the forefront of political debate and macroeconomic analyses (OECD 2012) .
Empirical contributions emphasize the importance of achieving …scal consolidation through public expenditures reductions. In empirical research, early enthusiasm towards expansionary contractions seems to have vanished (Perotti, 2011) . However Nickel, Rother and Zimmermann (2010) …nd that major debt reductions in the EU-15 during the period 1985-2009 were mainly caused by strategies based on reduction of government consumption, whereas revenuebased consolidation e¤orts were less successful. The same conclusion is reached in Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (2012) , who argue that spending-based adjustments are associated with mild and short-lived output losses, while tax-based adjustments are associated with deep and prolonged recessions.
Within the theoretical framework of DSGE models characterized by complete …nancial markets and optimizing households, expenditure-based …scal consolidations are a win-win strategy that reduces steady state distortionary taxation and raises private consumption even in the short run. This latter e¤ect obtains because, despite the output drop, a positive wealth e¤ ect is in place, driven by the expectation of permanently lower taxes. From this viewpoint, the NK-DSGE model gives similar predictions to those of RBC models (see, for example, Linnemann and Schabert, 2003) . Therefore, expenditure-based consolidations produce a gain without pain, as the policy entails a short-run consumption boom and a fall in labor e¤ort.
The assumption of homogeneous and forward-looking households is at best only partly consistent with actual consumer behavior. The predicted e¤ect of …scal consolidations may look rather grim if one takes into account the hypotesis of Limited Asset Market Participation (LAMP henceforth) 1 , implying a distinction between a fraction of households who have full access to …nancial markets (Ricardian households, henceforth) and a fraction of households who do not participate in …nancial markets and just consume their current income (Rule of Thumb, RT henceforth). For these households the …scal consolidation envisages a gain with pain if the short-run decline of output is associated to a reduction in their disposable income (Coenen, Mohr and Straub, 2008 , CMS henceforth; Almeida et al., 2013) . This result has been implicitly acknowledged in policy-oriented research that emphasizes the importance of pursuing "equity friendly" consolidation plans (OECD 2013) .
We investigate the contribution of …scal and monetary policies that may stabilize consumption of RT consumers, potentially restoring the gain without pain result. When all households are Ricardian, consumption choices mainly react to the present value of future tax payments, and the selected time path for the tax reduction plan is almost irrelevant. Under LAMP a fraction of households would certainly react to tax reductions implemented in the early phase of the consolidation process, when employment falls due to nominal rigidities. In addition, an important role might be played by temporary public transfers, that would be irrelevant under the representative household assumption. Another important issue is whether such policies might indeed have a limited e¤ect on the pace of debt consolidation due to their stimulus to output growth and therefore to …scal revenues. Finally, monetary policy might have a powerful stabilizing e¤ect on the consumption of constrained households if it exploited the complementarity between the consumption of Ricardian households, stimulated by the interest rate fall, and the labor income accruing to RT households.
We design a consolidation experiment where the long-run debt reduction is obtained through a temporary fall in public consumption and is associated to a permanent fall in tax rates. During the transition period we allow taxes (and public transfers) to react to the temporary drop in output. One important distinction between our work and previous contributions is that in our framework reducing public consumption is, by assumption, costly for the policymaker. This issue is typically neglected in the theoretical literature on …scal consolidations, despite the apparent di¢ culties that governments meet when attempting to cut their expenditures.
In a nutshell, our results are summarized as follows. First, we show that it is possible to both reduce public debt and boost consumption of RT households. This is obtained by allowing taxes to immediately undershoot their post-consolidation steady-state values. These "overexpansionary" …scal policies allow to raise the disposable income of RT consumers, and yet we do not observe a signi…cant slow down in the pace of debt reduction due to the favourable impact of consumption growth on output and government revenues. A similar result is obtained if temporary public transfers to RT households are exploited to stimulate demand. This is in sharp contrast with recent consolidation plans in advanced countries, that apparantly rely on both expenditure reductions and tax hikes ( Figure 1 ). Our …ndings suggest that such a policy mix is bound to depress consumption and economic activity. In fact, this study calls for new tax/transfer policies that limit the consumption gap between Ricardian and RT households and improve the performance of the macroeconomy in the short-medium run. Second, we …nd that an interest rate rule which reacts not only to in ‡ation but also to the output gap is an e¤ective complement to …scal policy as a stabilization tool. In fact, the output gap target induces the Central Bank to implement a stronger interest rate cut which triggers a surge in the consumption of Ricardian households. This, in turn, has bene…cial e¤ects on labor incomes and on RT households' consumption. We obtain the apparently paradoxical result that such a policy allows to obtain better control of in ‡ation, limiting de ‡ationary pressures. Third, our analysis also highlights the risk that, without an "aggressive" …scal policy, a large debt consolidation causes a slump so deep that the nominal interest rate is driven down to the zero lower bound. In this regard, we reach the important conclusion that transfer policies are far more e¤ective than tax reductions. Both policies have a stabilizing impact on aggregate demand, but tax reductions also lower marginal costs and in ‡ation, causing a downward pressure on the nominal interest rate. One strand of literature apparently related to our study is concerned with tax reforms and with the identi…cation of the (Ramsey optimal) …nancing mix between labor and capital taxation (Chamley, 1986 ; Judd, 1997; Guo and Lansing 1999; Greulich and Marcet, 2008; Garcia-Milà Marcet and Ventura, 2010). In fact our focus is quite di¤erent because we are mainly interested in the identi…cation of a short-run policy mix that can enhance the sustainability of long term debt reductions. At …rst sight, our contribution is akin to Cogan et al. (2012) who consider the e¤ects of …scal consolidations in a model that accounts for LAMP and emphasizes the importance of phasing in tax reductions. Indeed there are some important di¤erences between their work and ours. First, their de…nition of LAMP is such that a fraction of households do not participate in stocks and bonds markets but are allowed to hold money. Therefore, to the extent that their initial holdings of money balances are su¢ ciently large, these households may partly smooth consumption in response to a …scal consolidation that reduces output and labor incomes. In their model intertemporal consumption optimization therefore plays an important role even for constrained households. Second, they consider a consolidation experiment which is based on the contraction of public transfers and the contemporaneous reduction of distortionary taxes. Since transfers are by assumption equally shared by all households and Ricardian consumers account for two thirds of the population, the fall in transfers has a limited e¤ect on aggregate demand, whereas the lower tax rates unambiguously increases e¢ ciency. The overall e¤ect on demand is so strong that output increases even in the short run. In our analysis we abstract from apparently "easy" solutions where reducing public expenditures is costless by assumption. Further, in our experiment redistributive transfers may be a useful stabilization tool. Third, we consider the potential complementarity between …scal and monetary policies during the transition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of the model and the experiment implementation. Section 3 shows the short and long run results. Welfare e¤ects of the consolidation process are discussed in section 4. Section 5 reports some robustness analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes. It embodies both real and nominal frictions. Real frictions include: monopolistic competition in goods and labour markets, internal habits in consumption, variable capacity utilization, adjustment costs in investment decisions and distortionary taxation on labor and capital incomes. As for nominal frictions, prices and wages are sticky à la Calvo (1983) , with an indexation clause. 3 Our model accounts for LAMP, i.e. the economy is populated by two di¤er-ent household types: optimizing (Ricardian) households, who hold assets, and RT households, who just consume their current income and do not own any wealth.
To implement a welfare analysis of alternative policies based on expenditure reductions we assume that government spending enters households'utility functions. In particular, preferences are de…ned over private individual con- 
Moreover, b is the degree of internal habit formation in consumption, represents the inverse of Frish elasticity and denotes the weight of public spending in the utility function.
Fiscal Sector
The period government budget constraint is described as follows:
where T R de…nes real government consumption and transfers to households, b g is the outstanding stock of real debt, h and k de…ne tax rates on labor and capital respectively, K and wh respectively denote gross capital and labor incomes.
We model …scal consolidation as a permanent reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio via a temporary decline of the expenditure ratio. The …scal consolidation exercise entails a transition from one initial steady state where the debt-to-GDP ratio b g y is set at 70% to a new steady state where b g y = 60%, in line with Coenen et al. (2008) . In this experiment we assume that savings on interest payments are used to reduce taxes while the public spending ratio goes back to the initial steady state level. Therefore in the steady state associated to b g y = 60% tax distortions are unambiguously reduced and y > y . Since we are not interested in policy-induced long-run changes in capital-labor ratios, we posit that
Our policy experiments are better characterized as multi-period plans, and the full consolidation is achieved after several years. In this regard, the Ricardian households expectation of future variations in the policy instruments drives the bulk of our results. 4 The key tool used to achieve the debt reduction is a temporary reduction in public consumption. We assume that the …scal authority follows the rule:
where g y = (G =y ) = (G =y ) is the constant public consumption-to-GDP target ratio, g y;t (G t =y ) and b
) respectively de…ne time t levels of public consumption and debt in terms of post-consolidation steadystate output.
To model the behavior of taxes during the transition phase, we assume that relative tax rates are constant throughout the transition, i.e.
Then for the sake of brevity, from now on we only refer to labor tax rate. We consider two alternative tax rules. In the …rst case, we assume that taxes follow a highly inertial path towards the new steady state:
In the early stages of the consolidation experiment this allows to identify the permanent income e¤ect of a future tax reduction, that only a¤ects consumption choices of Ricardian households.
With the second rule we model taxes as automatic stabilizers in the spirit of Colciago et al. (2008) 5 .
This allows to assess the contribution of short-run tax adjustments to output stabilization, where taxes immediately impact on RT consumers' disposable income. Due to LAMP, temporary redistributive policies may have powerful stabilisation e¤ects on RT consumption but no e¤ect on Ricardian households.
To investigate this issue we also assume that transfers to RT consumers evolve according to the following rule:
where tr y = (T R =y ) = (T R =y ) is the constant public transfer-to-GDP target ratio and tr y;t (T R t =y ) de…nes time t levels of public transfers in terms of post-consolidation steady-state output. We also assume that steady state transfers are payed only to constrained households, as in Coenen et al., 2008).
Monetary Policy
The monetary authority sets its policy instrument R t according to a standard Taylor rule:
where t , , R and y t =y respectively denote the in ‡ation rate, the in ‡ation target, the interest rate target and the output gap de…ned with reference to the post-consolidation steady state.
Calibration
The baseline calibration of structural parameters 6 follows SW who estimate a DSGE model for the euro area.
As for …scal sector, the parameter governing the debt stabilization g in the government spending rule is set equal to 1, in line with the debt reduction experiment carried out by CMS. As in Colciago et al. (2008) , …scal responses to output -0 in (4) and 1 in (5) -are calibrated at 0.5. This value is also consistent with the empirical evidence in Van den Noord (2000) and adopted in studies on …scal stabilization (e.g. Westaway, 2003) . Moreover, to guarantee the inertial behavior of taxes according to (3) we set = 0:01. Furthemore, we draw from the estimates reported in Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) to assign the value to the average e¤ective capital-labor tax rate ratio 7 , i.e. Finally, the public spending and transfer steady state ratios are both …xed at 0:18, consistently with the national accounts data for Euro Area countries. 9 As for monetary policy, the parameter governing in ‡ation stabilization is calibrated at 1.5, in line with a conservative parametrisation in the literature and the parameter governing output stabilization y is set at 0.5, according to the classical Taylor rule speci…cation.
The parameter denoting the weight of public spending in the utility function is set at a level such that the calibrated public consumption to GDP ratio is indeed optimal according to the social planner choice and temporary expenditure reductions lower welfare.
The fraction of population following the rule of thumb in the Euro Area is estimated by the empirical evidence 10 in a range between 0.25 and 0.40. Following Campbell and Mankiw (1989), we …x the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers at 0.50. As a matter of fact, raising the share of RT consumer "stacks the cards" against the possibility that the tax reductions necessary to stabilize consumption do not substantially slow down the pace of debt reduction. 6 Appendix B summerizes in Table B1 parameters values and their description 7 In particular, while the labor tax rate is calibrated such that the …scal authority's budget is balanced at the debt-to-GDP target, the capital tax rate is anchored to the capital-labor tax rate ratio. 8 Results hold for di¤erent values of capital-labor tax rate ratios found in the literature, (Coenen et al., 2008; SGU, 2005) 9 Our results would not change if we used instead the corresponding ratios that charaterise the US economy. 3 Results
The Long-Run E¤ects of Fiscal Consolidation
In Table 1 we report the steady state adjustment of some key variables in consequence of the …scal consolidation. respectively de…ne the per-capita consumption levels of the two household types. The …scal consolidation improves the budgetary position of the government. These resources are used to lower labor and capital income taxes. This, in turn, causes an output expansion, due to an increase in both capital and labor supply. RT consumption unambiguously increases. Just like RT consumers, Ricardian households bene…t from the labor tax reduction. In addition they entirely appropriate the capital income tax reduction. However, they loose public debt service payments. As a result, the steady state variation in their consumption is negative.
Transition Dynamics
The next step in our analysis is a discussion of the short-run e¤ects under di¤erent …scal and monetary rules. We consider alternative scenarios.
1. No short-run …scal stabilization and pure in ‡ation targeting. In this case we are able to identify the role of "pure" announcements of future tax reductions. The tax rule follows (3), transfers are held constant and we set y = 0 in (6).
2. Short run …scal stabilization is based on (4), constant transfers and pure in ‡ation targeting.
3. Taxes follow (3), monetary policy is a pure in ‡ation targeter and transfers to RT consumers are activated as stabilizers according to (5).
Scenario 1. No …scal stabilizers and pure in ‡ation targeting
Figure 2 reports dynamics under scenario 1. Achieving the desired fall in the debt-to-GDP ratio takes about 37 quarters. Consider …rst what happens when all agents are Ricardian (blue line). After the government consumption reduction of about 2:5 percentage points, the output contraction is unavoidable. This is in turn associated to a lower real wage. As a consequence, marginal costs fall, bringing down in ‡ation and interest rates. Note that without RT agents the output reduction is associated with a boom in consumption, which initially overshoots its new long-run level. In line with previous contributions in thies …eld (see, for instance, Linnemann and Schabert, 2003), expenditure-based …scal consolidations produce a gain without pain because private consumption rises and the labor supply falls. Under LAMP (red line) the initial output fall is larger due to the fall in RT consumption. Note that in this case the …scal consolidation causes a temporary but strong increase in consumption inequality. In fact while Ricardian households raise their consumption, RT households do just the opposite in consequence of the fall in their current income. 
Scenario 3. Stabilization through redistribution
Stabilization through redistribution allows to both reduce debt and boost consumption. In Figure 4 , stabilization by means of transfers policy (red line) only operates through the demand-side e¤ect stemming from RT consumption, whereas use of taxes (blue line) produces favourable supply side e¤ects that raise output and labor income, thus increasing RT consumption. In addition, the tax fall lowers marginal costs and induces a larger interest rate reduction. This, in turn, stimulates Ricardian households consumption and strengthens the recovery of output. As a result we obtain that a pure demand-side …scal policy is less e¤ective in stimulating output convergence and has a weaker e¤ect on RT consumption. The other side of the coin is that stabilization through transfers entails a much faster speed of debt reduction, which is completed in about 38 quarters, and a quicker convergence of public consumption to the new steady state level. 
Welfare analysis
To measure the welfare e¤ects of the …scal consolidation experiment we follow Ascari and Ropele (2012) using the consumption equivalent measure (CEM) to compute the welfare-based ratio. 12 The CEM de…nes the fraction of steady state consumption that households have to give up to permanently reduce public debt. The welfare ratio is thus the ratio between CEM and the consolidation size. Since CEM is a welfare cost, …scal consolidation are welfare improving if the welfare ratio is negative.
Welfare e¤ects are reported in Table 2 . In the post-consolidation steady state (…rst row), RT consumers unambiguously bene…t from the …scal consolidation. Indeed, they gain about an extra 8% of consumption. Ricardian consumers bene…t from a far smaller welfare increase. Given that in the new steady state these households consume less and work more, this result is entirely determined by the bene…cial e¤ects of increased public consumption G, as documented in Table 1 .
Let's now consider the distributional e¤ects during the transition, according to the di¤erent policy scenarios. RT households unambiguously su¤er, irrespective of the policy scenario that is being implemented. The reason why this happens is that even when …scal stabilizers are used to support their consumption, their welfare during the transition is reduced by the public consumption contraction. Their preferred policy Scenario is 4a, which entails an output gap targeting using both interest rate and tax rules. In spite of the favorable income redistribution obtained under transfer policies, Scenarios 3 and 4b are not particularly helpful for RT households. The reason lies in the quicker consolidation process, associated to a less persistent …scal support to their consumption relative to what happens when tax stabilizers are implemented.
Ricardian households preferred Scenario is 2 that, relative to cases 1 and 3, is characterized by a prolonged persistence of their consumption above its post-consolidation steady state level. Di¤erently from what happens to RT consumers, the inclusion of an output gap feedback in the Taylor rule brings no bene…t to these households. In this section we consider the implications of implementing consolidation plans associated to higher initial levels of public debt (b y = 100%, b y = 120%). Under these assumptions, all previous results qualitatively hold, but the amplitude of short and long run adjustments is obviously larger. Our calculations show that under LAMP, but not under the representative agent assumption, the initial output slump may cause an in ‡ation fall so strong that the interest rate gets very close to the zero lower bound (ZLB henceforth, Figures 6 and 7) . 13 Note that attempts to stabilize the economy by reducing taxes (Scenario 2), while unambiguously e¤ective and desirable for their e¤ects on welfare, typically generate a stronger reduction in the nominal interest rate. Thus we observe an apparent tradeo¤ between the bene…cial welfare e¤ects of tax stabilization policies and the fragility of the macroeconomy, de…ned as the increased probability of hitting the ZLB. This result is better understood taking into account that the tax rule raises output but lowers marginal costs and therefore reduces in ‡ation. This is the key factor that drives the nominal interest closer to the ZLB under Scenario 2. By contrast under Scenario 3 (public transfers stabilize the economy) the …scal policy has no direct e¤ect on marginal costs and the in ‡ation rate fall is substantially dampened. We do not plot results for large consolidations under scenarios 4a and 4b because the feedback on the output gap brings the interest rate to the ZLB for the …scal feedbacks calibrations adopted in the previous section.
To better understand the features of the …scal-monetary policy mix under Scenarios 4a and 4b, for any value of the parameters 0 , 1 in the range [0: 5; 3] we computed the highest value of parameter y in the Taylor Rule (6) that is associated with positive nominal interest rates in all quarters of the consolidations episodes.
14 Figures 8 and 9 show that strengthening parameter 1 in (5) also allows to implement a more aggressive output feedback in the Taylor rule, whereas the choice of 0 in (4) 
Conclusions
This paper shows that an appropriate mix of …scal and monetary policies can substantially ease the strain typically associated to …scal consolidations. The public expenditure reduction should be supported either by a temporary public transfers increase or by a tax rates fall that undershoots their new post consolidation values. Such policies have a strong stabilizing e¤ect on the disposable income of RT consumers. This, in turn, stimulates demand and supports growth. As a result, the pace of debt reduction is substantially preserved because the revenues loss from lower tax rates (larger transfers) is largely compensated for by an increase in the tax base. The result is even strengthened when the monetary authority targets both in ‡ation and output gap. In this case the stronger interest rate fall is bene…cial because it exploits the complementarity between the consumption of Ricardian households and the disposable income of RT consumers. Our analysis shows that choosing tax reductions generates larger welfare gains, but transfers reduce the risk of hitting the ZLB because they have a relatively stronger impact on in ‡ation. This latter result has potentially important implications in the current EMU predicament, where perypheral countries are striving to reduce debt-to-GDP ratios but the ECB interest rate policy is already constrained by the ZLB. In fact our results suggest that expenditure reductions should be complemented by …scal stimuli that limit further downward pressure on in ‡ation. We leave this for future research.
Appendix A: The Model
In this Appendix we lay out the full model structure.
Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by i, i 2 [0; 1]. RT (rt) and Ricardian (o) agents are respectively de…ned over the intervals [0; ] and [ ; 1]. All households share the same utility function.
Consumption bundles
The consumption good is assumed to be a composite good produced with a continuum of di¤erentiated goods c i t via the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption basket of household i:
where > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution across di¤erent varieties of goods. The set of demand equations is:
where
de…nes the aggregate price consumption index.
Labour market structure
It is assumed a continuum of di¤erentiated labour inputs indexed by j, j 2 [0; 1]. Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005), household i supplies all labour inputs. Moreover, as it is a common practice in the literature on LAMP in DSGE models, for sake of tractability, we assume that the labor supplies of the two households groups are perfect substitutes in production (Galì et al. Maestri and Roventini, 2012). Further, dynamics that typically arise in LAMP models are determined by the pro…t margins variations associated to changes in real wages earned by RT consumers. By contrast, cyclical variations in real wages earned by Ricardian households are entirely o¤set by the corresponding changes in pro…t margins. In this regard, our results should survive richer labor market characterizations, such as in Lansing and Markiewicz (2013) who allow for capital-skill complementarity, where the Ricardian agents are viewed as skilled whereas RT households are not. One related issue is that the two households groups might supply di¤erent amounts of labor at the given wage rate. Under a …scal consolidation this would imply that consumption di¤erences would be partly substituted with leisure di¤erences.
Labor type-speci…c unions indexed by j 2 [0; 1] have some monopoly power in the labour market and make wage-setting decisions. Given the wage W j t …xed by union j, households are assumed to supply enough labour h j t to satisfy demand. That is,
where w > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across di¤erent labour inputs, h d t is the aggregate labour demand and
is the aggregate wage index. As in Galì (2007), it is assumed that the fraction of Ricardian and non-Ricardian households is uniformly distributed across unions and the aggregate demand for each labor type is uniformly distributed across households. Therefore optimizers and rule of thumbers work for the same amount of time. The labour supply, which is common across households, must satisfy the resource constraint h It is assumed that Ricardian households own physical capital K o t , accumulate it and then rent it out the …rms at a real interest rate r k t . Moreover, the optimizers can control the intensity u t at which the capital is utilized. Hence, the cost of capital depends upon the degree of utilization a (u t ) and it is de…ned as a (u t ) = 1 (u t 1) + 
where is the deprecion rate of capital. The function S introduces the adjustment costs on investment and satis…es the following properties:
Hence, the Lagrangean reads as: 
Following CEE (2005), the adjustment cost function is given by:
Rule of thumb households
As pointed out above, Non-Ricardian agents just consume current labor income because they cannot save neither invest. Since they don't have access to capital markets, they only pay taxes on labor income and receive transfers from the government. Therefore:
The marginal utility of consumption for rule of thumbers is 
Wage Setting
In this model wages are set according to the Calvo (1983) framework. In particular each period a union faces a constant probability (1 w ) of being able to reoptimize wages. In other words, w denotes the degree of wage stickiness. The unions which are not able to reoptimize the wage index it to a geometric average of past in ‡ation and steady-state in ‡ation according to the following rule:
where the parameter w 2 [0; 1] is the indexation parameter.
Unions, in choosing the optimal wage w t , have to take into account that they might not be able to do the same after s periods. If this is the case, taking into account that all unions resetting at time t choose the same wage, the real wage at the generic period t + s will be:
Hence, to derive the households' …rst order conditions with respect to the optimal wage, it is possible to pull out the part of the Lagrangean which is useful for this purpose. In particular, a weighted average of the two households types utility function is maximized by the optimizing union which will take into account of not being able to reoptimize in the future. Therefore the union objective is: is the average marginal utility between the Ricardian and non Ricardian's marginal utilities. The …rst order condition with respect to the optimal wage is:
( w 1) The term
w is the markup that would prevail in absence of wage stickiness 16 . It's now convenient to write the wage setting equation in recursive form by de…ning:
where m f zt denotes the real money balances by …rm z and is the fraction of wage which is payed in advance. The wage is lent by Ricardian households which at the end of the period receive back money at the gross nominal interest rate.
Therefore the marginal costs the …rms have to face reads as:
Price Setting
As for wages, prices are set according to the Calvo (1983) framework. In each period a …rm faces a constant probability (1 ) of being able to re-optimize prices. Non re-optimizing …rms index their price to a geometric average of past in ‡ation and steady-state in ‡ation:
The optimal price P t is chosen in order to maximize the discounted value of expected future pro…ts. Moreover, it's important to remind here that only Ricardian households own …rms. Hence, the …rms'maximization problem is:
P t+s mc t+s y t;t+s (z) subject to:
P t+s denotes the stochastic discount factor of Ricardian households.
The …rst order condition with respect to P t is:
The term ( 1) is the markup which would prevail in absence of price stickiness 17 . It's useful to write the price setting equation in recursive form by de…ning:
t+s mc t+s and
By writing recursively:
and
t+1
(1 )
It's possible to rewrite the price setting equation as:
Aggregation
The aggregate production function is: 
As for transfers:
given that by assumption transfers are assigned to RT consumers only .
Market clearing 7.10.1 Goods market equlibrium
The expression warranting the equilibrium in the good market is:
where s t denotes the resource cost due to relative price dispersion in the Calvo model. It evolves according to:
where p t , in the light of the aggregate price index, must satisfy: 
Labour market equilibrium
The equilibrium on the labour market is given by: 
Fiscal Authority
The government budget constraint in nominal tems reads as:
P t G t + P t T R t + B t = P t k t r k t u t a (u t ) q t K t + P t h t w t h t + V t B t+1
where B t is the number of 1 period bonds issued at time t 1, where reimbursement at maturity is 1 dollar. V t is the dollar price at which the bond is sold at time t. The gross interest rate is R t = is the real rembursement value of debt.
Monetary Authority
Monetary authority adjusts the nominal interest rate according to the following rule: 
